Overcoming the 'Post-War Regime:' Abe Shinzō and Japan's State Identity A Critical Discourse Analysis by Bock, Christian de
 Overcoming the ‘Post-War Regime:’ Abe Shinzō and 
Japan’s State Identity 
A Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name:   Christian de Bock 
Student number:  S1450085 
Program:  MA in Asian Studies (60 ECTS): Politics, Society, and                   
Economy  
Supervisor:  Dr. B.A. Bryce Wakefield 
Date:   01-06-2017 
Wordcount:  15557 
Christian de Bock S1450085 
 
2 
 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 
Literature Review....................................................................................................................... 5 
Theory: Identity and Contestation ........................................................................................... 10 
Critical Discourse Analysis as Methodology ........................................................................... 14 
Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Protracted Revisionism..................................................................... 16 
Japan’s National Security Strategy as an ‘Imaginary’ for Revisionism .................................. 22 
Tracing the National Security Discourse in Japan’s Security Debate: 2012-2015 .................. 28 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 34 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian de Bock S1450085 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
I will resolutely set forth bold policies to promote the creation of a "new Japan" led 
through true political leadership which is founded on mutual trust between politics and 
the public sector.1 
Since the return Of Abe Shinzō as Prime Minister of Japan in 2012, some critics have 
claimed that Japan’s state identity as an anti-militarist state has come ‘under siege to a degree 
not seen since its creation over 50 years ago.’2 Certainly, the Abe cabinet’s revisionist push to 
reinterpret the country’s 1947 ‘peace’ constitution has only been rivalled by the 1954 
interpretation that allowed for the creation of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF). As 
such, Abe’s stated desire to overcome the ‘post-war regime’ has again brought to the 
forefront the discussion regarding the future of what in Japan is described as its “pacifist” 
state identity. This is a debate whether either continuity and change are discernible in Japan’s 
contemporary identity and the role of either the structural and material or ideational factors as 
the driving force in guaranteeing either stability or change. It is these questions that in recent 
years have shaped the debate between the constructivist schools of both norm- and relational 
constructivism—resulting into a schism between both approaches.     
 The current debate between both norm- and relational constructivists centres around 
the efficacy of ideational factors in ensuring identity change. Contemporary norm 
constructivists continue to adhere to the argument that only significant structural and material 
shocks can overcome the institutionalized norm of anti-militarism within Japanese society.3 
Relational constructivists, however, reject such a notion, arguing instead that material factors 
do not have any exact meaning outside of the discourses within which they are constituted 
and that as such identity discourses can be rearticulated as to encompass remilitarizing 
practices.4 So, whilst norm constructivists remain indebted to a positivist epistemology their 
relational counterparts have abandoned this altogether—thus allowing for schism between 
both approaches to emerge. It is this dichotomy, which is based on the exaggerated notion of 
the efficacy of either the material or ideational in effecting identity change that this thesis will 
use as its point of entry for enquiry.         
                                                 
1 Shinzō Abe, “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe”, The Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, 26 
December 2012, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201212/26danwa_e.html. 
2 Andrew L. Oros, “International and Domestic Challenges to Japan’s Postwar Security identity: ‘norm 
constructivism’ and Japan’s new ‘Proactive Pacifism’”, The Pacific Review 28:1 (2015), 158. 
3 Ibid, 157. 
4 Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, “War is Peace: the Rearticulation of ‘Peace’ in Japan’s China Discourse”, 
Review of International Studies (2015), 21. 
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 To this end this thesis will turn to the theoretical and methodological insights of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as espoused by Norman Fairclough, as to incorporate a 
dialectical relation between the material and discursive into the conceptualization of Japan’s 
state identity. Such an approach will allow for a more nuanced understanding of material and 
discursive factors in either enabling or restraining new discourses and policies to emerge. 
This enquiry will be guided by posing the question of: what discursive strategies did Abe 
Shinzō utilize as to overcome the restraints imposed by Japan’s ‘peace-loving’ state identity 
as to effect the remilitarization of Japan? As to come to a conclusion, this thesis will utilize 
an interdisciplinary approach that combines International Relations (IR) insights on state 
identity with an understanding of political power as conceptualized by Antonio Gramsci and 
the critical engagement with discourse as theorized by Fairclough’s’ variant of CDA. 
 Such an interdisciplinary approach allows for a conceptualization of identity that 
provides a more nuanced understanding of the role of the discursive and material in the 
maintenance and contestation of Japan’s state identity. Within this thesis, an identity is 
conceptualized as a hegemonic entity that through its ‘directionality’ either enables or 
restrains the emergence of new discourses and practices. These restraints govern both the 
‘social field’ of security and the accompanying ‘order of discourse’ of security through the 
stable reproduction of legitimate discourse and practice by the ‘discourse circles’ that police 
the field. As such the hegemonic identity provides ‘meaning in the service of power’ that 
maintains social hierarchies and power relations within society. In order to successfully 
overcome the restraints imposed by the identity, a political entrepreneur is required to work 
from within the identity as to negate the political costs of contestation. This entails the 
formulation of a discursive strategy that through the re-articulation and creation of new 
discourses within an ‘imaginary’ seek to overcome, or appropriate the directionality of a 
hegemonic identity. However, this requires that such strategies are practically adequate, 
meaning politically feasible and legitimate as to be operationalized.    
 In order to critically engage with this process within Japan’s identity politics this 
thesis will be structured as follows. First, it will provide an assessment of the current 
literature, critiquing, in particular, the current schism between norm- and relational 
constructivist works as to find a point of entry for this study. Following this critical 
discussion, a theoretical framework for the contestation of a state identity will be 
conceptualized. As a midway point this study will formulate its methodology of CDA and 
how this methodology engages with identity and political theory. The substantial chapters of 
this thesis will begin with a critical inquiry into the revisionist ambitions of Abe Shinzō by 
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engaging with his own speeches and writing as well as relevant literature. The second part 
will critically engage with Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) and posits this as a 
‘imaginary’ for action. Within the third part the discourses unearthed in the second section 
will be traced ‘real-time’ as to see how these discourses were being operationalized. The 
study will conclude with a summary of, and a critical engagement with its findings.  
Literature Review 
Since the end of the Cold War the question of whether Japan was to remain a “pacifist” 
state – as many of its leaders, citizens and outside observers believed it had been after World 
War II – or should instead become a ‘normal country,’ has caused ample debate. In academic 
circles, some IR scholars using realist theories predicted Japan’s imminent remilitarization 
and re-emergence as a great power. However, scholars adhering to the newly emerged school 
of constructivism professed a contrary opinion: Japan would remain a pacifist country on 
account of its state identity which was grounded in anti-militarist norms. Indeed, Japan was 
viewed as a central case study in early constructivist scholarship, given that it often appeared 
to harbour an extreme aversion to military solutions to international problems. However, in 
recent years scholars belonging to either norm- or relational constructivist schools have 
formulated contrary opinions on whether ideational factors provide a stable structure for 
identity or otherwise provide a catalyst through which identity change can be effected. This 
has led to a schism between both approaches regarding agency and structure, as well as 
positivist and post-positivist research methodologies.     
 As the Cold War ended and Japan’s response to international calls to ‘show the flag’ 
in the 1991 Gulf War was deemed inadequate, positivist accounts started to increasingly 
predict Japan’s imminent, although reluctant, ‘normalisation’ as a ‘great power.’5 Such a 
development was, according to these authors, either unavoidable on account of the threat 
posed by structural changes to Japan’s ‘interest,’6 or otherwise as the result of U.S. pressure.7 
However, the then emergent literature of what Nicholas Onuf would term ‘constructivism’ 
began to question the predictions made by the dominant positivist paradigms, realism and 
liberalism. This entailed a critique of the prime actor within IR: the nation-state. Whereas 
positivism posited the nation-state as constituted by its self-interest within an anarchic 
international system, constructivists such as Alexander Wendt instead argued that ‘anarchy is 
                                                 
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25:1 (2000), 33. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Kenneth B. Pyle. The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, D.C.: The AEI 
Press, 1992), 3-5. 
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what states make of it’ and that as such both nation-states and their perception of the 
‘anarchic’ system were actually social constructs.8       
 Within the constructivist literature, Japan was presented as a case in point to the 
theorem’s central assumption on account of its ‘abnormal,’ or ‘reactive’ foreign policy which 
failed to adhere to realist theoretical orthodoxy. According to scholars such as Peter 
Katzenstein and Thomas Berger, this was due to Japan having developed an ‘identity’ centred 
around a ‘culture of anti-militarism,’9 or ‘peaceful cultural norms.’10 This “pacifist,” or more 
accurately anti-militarist, identity was the outcome of a process of political negotiation that 
followed Japan’s defeat in World War II and the nation’s politicians perception of this 
calamity.11 This process had engendered a widespread distrust of the military within Japanese 
society which had ensured that anti-militarist norms had become institutionalized within 
Japan – thus ensuring Japan’s peaceful international politics through the structure provided 
by the identity. Yet, despite these early norm constructivists adhering to critical theoretical 
assumptions, they retained a theoretical proximity to positivist theories by arguing that 
Japan’s identity could only be altered by significant structural shocks – an assumption that 
would continue to reverberate to this day.12        
 In following decades works centred around identity as an independent variable that 
guided state action continued to proliferate. Although identity as a concept had been 
criticized of ‘definitional anarchy,’ IR scholars sought to save the concept by investing 
‘identity with the analytical rigor and methodological  imagination needed to make it a 
measurable variable across the social sciences.’13 This resulted in works that sought to study 
the salience of different role identities in varying international contexts, 14  whilst others 
sought to more rigorously conceptualize identity as to prevent a too deterministic application 
of the concept with regard to its influence over policy preferences. 15 One of the most salient 
works that utilized identity as an independent variable was Andrew Oros’s: Normalizing 
Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practices (2008). Oros, a norm 
                                                 
8 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” International 
Organization 46: 2 (1992), 395. 
9 Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” International 
Security 17:4 (1993), 120. 
10 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, , “Japan’s national security: structures, norms and policies,” 
International Security (1993), 104. 
11Berger, “From Sword,” 131. 
12 Ibid 147. 
13 Rawi Abdelal, et al, “Identity as a Variable,”  Perspectives on Politics 4:4 (2006), 695, 696. 
14 Amy Y. Catalinac. “Identity Theory and Foreign Policy: Explaining Japan’s Responses to the 1991 Gulf War 
and the 2003 U.S. War in Iraq,” Politics & Policy 35 (2007), 91. 
15 Kuniko Ashizawa. “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution-Building and Japanese 
Foreign Policy,” International Studies Review 10 (2008),573, 575. 
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constructivist, argued that Japan possessed a ‘security identity’ of which the stability, despite 
constant contestation, could be explained by the identity being formulated around flexible 
principles which had become hegemonic within the Japanese state and evolved with time.16   
Like earlier norm constructivists, Oros continued to adhere to the notion that in the absence 
of structural and material shocks Japan’s security identity would remain unaltered.17 As such, 
it was not until the advent of relational constructivist works that Japan’s identity was 
conceptualized as transforming on account of the alterations being made to the identity’s 
discursive content.          
 Relational constructivism as a monistic method refuses to divide the social world into 
material and social spheres on account of the difficulty of separating ‘material factors’ from 
the discourses within which they are constituted as objects.18 Instead relational constructivism 
prefers to operate in the realm of social activity within which social constructs such as a 
state’s identity are regarded as the ‘ongoing accomplishments of practice.’19 This entails that 
the relational account of the social world, through its rejection of ‘reality,’ denies the 
existence of a constituting essence – consisting of norms – that informs a state’s being – thus 
preferring the analysis of discursive agency over the empiricist analysis of normative 
structures.20 This has engendered a methodology of postmodern discourse  analysis, within 
which the constituting discourses of the ‘Self’ vis-à-vis the ‘Other’ are analysed as to discern 
changes in an identity’s boundaries. The resulting body of text have been preoccupied with 
notions such as: ‘reification,’ ‘securitization,’ and ‘exceptionalization.’ In applying these 
concepts relational constructivists have endeavoured to demonstrate how, for example, 
discourses on Asia as a ‘thing out there’ that represents either a ‘threat,’ or an ‘opportunity’  
reify pre-War discourses and engender a similar policy mindset. 21   Whilst other works 
demonstrated how Japanese politicians have sought to frame China as a ‘bully,’22 and North 
Korea as an ‘aggressor,’23  as to discursively justify the remilitarization of Japan.   
                                                 
16Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, identity and the evolution of security practice (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), 1, 10. 
17 Ibid, 188. 
18 Hagström and Hanssen, “War is peace,” 21. 
19 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Hegel’s House, or ‘People are states too,’ Review of International Studies  30:2 
(2004), 285-286.  
20 Ibid, 284. 
21 Taku Tamaki, “The persistence of reified Asia as reality in Japanese foreign policy narratives,” The Pacific 
Review 28:1 (2015), 24, 41. 
22 Shogo Suzuki, “The rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan’s construction of identity: Is China a focal point of 
Japanese nationalism?,” The Pacific Review 28:1 (2015), 106. 
23 Linus Hagström and Ulv Hanssen, “The North Korean abduction issue: emotions, securitisation and the 
reconstruction of Japanese identity form ‘aggressor’ to ‘victim’ and from ‘pacifist’ to ‘normal’,” The Pacific 
Review 28:1 (2015), 84-85. 
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 Despite both norm- and relational constructivists having acknowledged an use for the 
methods of the other school, in recent works it seems that the positivist-post-positivist divide 
existing within constructivism has caught up with the study of Japan’s state identity.24 Norm 
constructivists  have welcomed the analysis of discourse as possibly contributing to answers 
to the question of how ‘the democratic process of organized politics interacts with self-other 
conceptions to result in both policy change and identity change.’25 Similarly, early relational 
works have emphasized common ground with norm constructivists in arguing that the 
emergence of discourses ‘is defined, inter alia, through the production and reproduction of 
discursively emergent norms and institutions.’26 However,  Linus Hagström and Ulv 
Hanssen’s “War is peace: the rearticulation of ‘peace’ in Japan’s China discourse” (2015) has 
moved away from this position. Within this work both authors postulated  that Japan’s 
identity centred around the master signifier of ‘peace’ has been rearticulated as to encompass 
remilitarizing practices.27 Furthermore, the article abandons the notion that pacifist norms 
have informed Japan’s anti-militarist identity, instead professing this to have solely been the 
outcome of discourses of the Self in relation to the Other.28  As such a “pacifist” identity can 
allow for “pacifist” behaviour whilst simultaneously being commensurate with re-militarizing 
practices.           
 By arguing that the notion of a pacifist identity ensures pacifist behaviour was a 
mistaken assumption, Hagström and Hanssen have moved closer to postmodern orthodoxy 
then their earlier works did. In the past Hagström still argued that particular discourses were 
‘sedimented’ and thus resilient to change. 29  However, Hagström’s  recent work instead 
focusses on the transitivity of signifiers, meaning that a signifiers meaning is derived from its 
relation to other signifiers and not from a referent object – as per Saussure’s 
conceptualization of language. 30  This conceptualization is, however, problematic in 
conceptualizing how discursive changes are related to alterations occurring simultaneously in 
the material world. As a result postmodern discourse analysis has been criticized of ‘noting 
the [discursive] construction and suggestively placing it within some context of an event,’ 
without providing any argumentation as to how both discursive and material changes are 
                                                 
24 Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it,” 393. 
25 Oros, “International and domestic challenges,” 158-159 
26 Linus Hagström and Karl Gustafsson, “Japan and identity change: why it matters in International Relations,” 
The Pacific Review 28:1 (2015), 13 
27 Hagström and Hanssen, “War is peace,” 6. 
28 Ibid, 19. 
29 Hagström and Gustafsson, “Japan and identity,”  6. 
30 Hagström and Hanssen, “War is peace,” 8. 
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related.31 This refusal to conceptualize discourse causality emerges from the transitive nature 
of discourse which entails that new or re-articulated discourses can emerge freely through the 
‘play of difference’ as the outcome of discourse transitivity.     
 Nevertheless, this conceptualization of discursive emergence has been criticized by 
Critical Discourse Analysists who argue the it idealises discursive emergence and ‘ignores 
the dialectical interpenetration of semiotic and non-semiotic facets of social events. The play 
of difference is materially, socially and psychologically constrained.’32 Both the failure to 
account for discourse causality and the restrained nature of discursive emergence has affected 
Hagström and Hanssen’s work in that its longitudal approach simply noted the change in 
discourse without tying this meaningfully to extra-discursive changes. Furthermore, through 
the rejection of a material ‘reality’ both authors also fail to explain whether the emergence of 
these new discourses are likely to garner the legitimacy within society needed for their 
sustained invocation.           
 As such it will prove prudent to conceptualize the discursive and material as existing 
in a dialectic relation as professed by CDA. It then becomes possible to move past the 
exaggerated notion of postmodern discursive emergence whilst opening up the space to  
conceptualize how this dialectic renders discourse as a causal mechanism through the 
restrictions it imposes.33 Another advantage of such an approach is that it also rectifies norm 
constructivist exaggerations regarding the efficacy of material factors such as: ‘substantial 
changes in material factors combined with observed actor conduct be reasonably understood 
to change actor perceptions (…) without a lengthy evaluation of discourse .’ 34  This 
completely disregards the role that discourse plays within the process of generating and 
altering such perceptions through a variety of discursive practices such as reification and re-
articulation, thus excluding an important aspect of  the social world from analysis. As such 
this thesis regards a CDA methodology as being well suited to move past both norm- and 
relational constructivist exaggerations of the material and discursive respectively by instead 
conceptualizing both factors as existing in a dialectic relation. Thus allowing a more nuanced 
understanding of the role both factors play on constituting and contesting Japan’s state 
identity.  
                                                 
31 Benjamin Banta, “Analysing discourse as a causal mechanism” European Journal of International Relations 
19:2 (2012), 394. 
32 Norman Fairclough, CDA: The Critical Study of Language (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 
215. 
33 Banta, “Analysing discourse,” 381. 
34 Oros, “International and domestic challenges,” 145 
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Theory: Identity and Contestation 
The stability of Japan’s state identity is often attributed to the social construct’s 
supposed hegemony. Despite the efficacy of this concept, both norm- and relational 
constructivist have failed to conceptualize a theory of hegemony that corresponds to both the 
discursive and material facets of this construct, instead preferring either a material or 
discursive focus respectively. Nevertheless, to fully comprehend a state’s identity’s 
production, maintenance and contestation it is important to subject both material and 
discursive factors to analysis. To this end this section will draw on CDA and Critical Realist 
insights as to conceptualize Japan’s state identity’s stability as related to the dialectic between 
the discursive and the material. Subsequent to this conceptualization this section will engage 
with how identity entrepreneurs can overcome the restraints imposed by the existing 
hegemony as to effect their desired identity changes.        
 Hegemony, according to Norman Fairclough, can be best understood as ‘intellectual 
and moral leadership’ that through the construction of alliances and integration of subordinate 
groups seeks to establish a ‘unstable equilibrium’ a momentary and fragile consensual 
relation of domination of one group, or more likely, a coalition of groups, over all others.35 
Hegemony is the outcome of what Antonio Gramsci termed the ‘War of Position.’  This war 
is a discursive struggle that seeks to render the views of a particular coalition as ‘historically 
true’ and thus ‘naturalizing’ these views within society as to legitimate the power-relations 
and social hierarchies that are the outcome of this struggle.36 As such, once a hegemony has 
been effected this social construct provides ‘meaning in the service of power’ and is a such 
ideological.37 This illustrates that hegemonic struggles are discursive in that they draw on 
discursive practices as to effect policy changes, whilst at the same time the meaning of these 
discourses are being disputed.38         
 Within a stable hegemony discourse provides a framework that allows the continued 
cooperation of a variety of  actors within society. The stability of a hegemonic construct, such 
as an identity, then requires the maintenance of the ‘unstable equilibrium’ by continuing 
discursive labour and political negotiation as to uphold the structure. This process is, 
according to CDA scholars, facilitated by a dialectic between the discursive and the material. 
This dialectic is best described as the ‘internalization’ of discourse within practice and vice-
                                                 
35 Norman Fairclough, CDA, 61-62, 128. 
36 Benedetto Fontana, “Hegemony and Power in Gramsci,” in Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion. 
Howson and Kyle ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 93. 
37 37Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (New York: Longman, 1989), 91. 
38 Fairclough, CDA, 129-130. 
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versa, with ‘internalization’ meaning that both discourse and practice are ‘different but not 
discrete’ from one another.39  This internalization should, however, not be mistaken for the 
norm constructivist concept of identity and action mutually constituting one another. Since 
the maintenance of a hegemony requires constant discursive labour and negotiation there 
exists no certainty that an identity centred around, for instance “pacifism,” will always 
produce “pacifist” behaviour. According to CDA adherents treating something as if it where 
x can ‘in varying degrees, depending on the situation succeed in making them x.’40 As such 
“pacifist” behaviour of a “pacifist” state is never more than a disposition—not a given.  
 As such, the stability of a state identity requires that actors within society continue to 
subscribe to the existing power-relations. Within this process the existing hegemony 
facilitates the maintenance of these relations by providing the existing structure with 
legitimacy through ‘naturalized’ and ‘internalized’ discourses. This means that the power to 
act is legitimate in that: ‘(a) it conforms to established rules, (b) the rules can be justified by 
reference to shared beliefs, and (c) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the 
particular power relation.’ 41   Within Japan’s state identity discourses centred around 
“pacifism” possess all three of these tenets, after all, power-relations and social hierarchies 
have been accepted and discourses and laws regarding Japan’s “pacifist” behaviour are 
widely internalized.42 With regard to the last two this entails that “pacifist” discourses convey 
‘legal-rational’ legitimacy, namely: the understanding of the legality of patterns of rules and 
the right of those in power to issue commands under these rules; and ‘value-rational’ 
legitimacy, or the virtue of the rational belief in an absolute value.43 A failure to articulate 
discourses within this field of legitimacy will ensure: illegitimacy, a legitimacy deficit, or 
delegitimation, respectively.44        
 It is these value and legal restraints that CDA adherents refer to when they argue that 
the emergence of discourse is restrained by social and material factors—as such anything can 
be stated but not legitimately so. Furthermore, CDA posits these restraints as a discourse’s 
‘directionality,’ or a discourse’s causal power.45 Discourse causality is a controversial subject, 
yet can perhaps be best understood through the Critical Realist concept of ‘emergence.’ The 
                                                 
39 Norman Fairclough, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, in The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis, James 
Paul Gee and Michael Handford ed. (London: Routledge, 2012), 11. 
40 Banta, “Analysing discourse,” 391. 
41 Fairclough, CDA, 493. 
42 Oros, Normalizing Japan,  
43 Fairclough, CDA, 493-494.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Banta, “Analysing discourse,” 391. 
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concept of ‘emergence’ entails that the properties possessed by a whole are not possessed by 
its parts.46 With regard to discourses this entails that the ability of a particular discourse to 
enable or restrain certain policy, emanates from ‘discourse circles,’ or a ‘group of positioned 
individuals who act and speak in a way that a discourse becomes “endorsed and enforced.” 47 
These ‘discourse circles’ are comprised of political actors, institutions and organizations that 
inhibit the different ‘social fields’ which are ‘social domain[s] obeying a specific logic,’ one 
such a field being for instance that of security.48 By drawing on  discourses that are deemed 
legitimate, discourse circles can either enable or restrain action whilst at the same time 
safeguarding the existing power-relations and hierarchies that both value- and legal-rational 
legitimacy uphold.           
 The above illustrates that any actor that seeks to contest this hegemony will have to 
engage with the vested interest of various institutions and organizations of which society is 
comprised, as well as the values and laws that govern both the political- and social spheres. 
Needless to say, any discourse or policy that fails to subscribe to conventions deemed 
legitimate, may require the excessive usage of political capital which could result in failure. 
After all as William Connolly noted: ‘align[ing] oneself to closely with difference is to render 
oneself incomprehensible to one’s own community.’49 As such, contestation requires that an 
actor relies not only on political force as to impose changes to the material composition of  
society, but also that new discourses are articulated and old ones delegitimized or re-
articulated. This requires that an actor, or identity entrepreneur, engages with the relevant 
‘orders of discourse’ that either enable, or restrain, the desired reforms. An ‘order of 
discourse’ is the grouping of discourses that constitute social fields, institutions and 
organizations as networks of social practice. 50  It is through discourse creativity—the 
imposition of discourses from other social fields, the articulation of new discourses and the 
re-articulation of existing ones—that an identity entrepreneur can seek to alter the order of 
discourse as to overcome, or negate, its directionality.51     
 Within Japan this could entail that an identity entrepreneur like Abe Shinzō could 
attempt to replace Japan’s “pacifist” state identity by altering the order of discourse that 
                                                 
46 Elder-Vass, The Causal Power of Social Structures, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 4. 
47 Banta, “Analysing discourse,” 393. 
48 Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage 
Publications, 2002), 72. 
49 William E. Connoly, Identity/Difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 44. 
50 Fairclough, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 11. 
51 Jorgensen and Phillips, Discourse Analysis  71-72.  
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governs the field of security, as to allow for Japan to become a more ‘normal’ country. 
Nevertheless, since remilitarizing practices are highly controversial within both Japan’s 
political and civil society, replacing “pacifist” discourses with, for instance, ‘realist’ 
discourses would likely fail or cost excessive political capital. This indicates that within 
Japan the needed ‘practical adequacy’52 for such a discursive strategy is missing in that the 
political agents involved do not possess the needed power to bring them into being and that 
the imagined reality is not possible. The current state of affairs might as such require that a 
‘displaced’ discursive strategy is articulated, which is the act of replacing a strategy that is 
desired but lacking in public conviction with another strategy that does resonate within civil 
society.53            
 A displaced strategy is thus essentially a surreptitious attempt to affect the outcome of 
the desired, yet controversial strategy, by presenting it as desirable strategy to civil society—
thus appropriating public consent and also legitimacy. Operationalizing a displaced strategy 
thus requires that the objective envisioned within it resonates with the public as to secure the 
desired outcome. This will require that such a strategy partially upholds and re-articulate 
existing discourses with the relevant order of discourse, whilst also introducing new 
discourses aimed at corroding the very order within which these discourses are articulated. 
This entails that a displaced strategy might outwardly resemble discursive stability whilst 
actually attempting to contest the social order. When Andrew Oros, with regard to Japan’s 
2013 National Security Strategy, noted that: ‘the NSS adopted by the allegedly ‘hyper-
nationalist’ cabinet of Abe Shinzō (...) proclaims repeatedly Japan’s long-standing ‘peace-
loving’ policies,’ he mistakenly believed this to be an indication of continued stability within 
Japan’s state identity.54 Instead, the NSS could arguably be considered as an ‘imaginary’ 
which functions as an integral part to a displaced strategy.      
 An ‘imaginary’ is a  ‘pre-figuring of a possible and intended reality, which includes 
an objective (…) and the means to achieve it,’ and forms an integral part of discursive 
strategies.55 For the construction of an imaginary strategic documents, such as Japan’s 2013 
NSS, are ideally suited. Through a strategic document’s problem-solution construction a 
“threat” can be articulated that requires security reforms as to negate the “threat”. 
Furthermore, by construing a “threat” as posing an existential threat to both peace and 
prosperity an imaginary can attempt to redraw the boundaries generated by both value-
                                                 
52 Fairclough, CDA, 480. 
53 Ibid, 501. 
54  Oros, ‘International and Domestic Challenges”, 140. 
55 Fairclough, CDA, 480. 
Christian de Bock S1450085 
 
14 
 
rational- and legal-ratioanl legitimacy. To this purpose an ‘imaginary’ contained within a 
strategic document can articulate a “threat” from which a particular referent object—for 
instance the ‘peace and prosperity’ of Japan—needs to be secured through extraordinary 
political means, thus suspending particular legal mores that stand in the way of effecting the 
goals of the displaced strategy. In other words the issue at hand is ‘securitized.’56  The 
discourses espoused within such a document can then subsequently be appropriated by 
relevant discourse circles and disseminated to the public as to  garner their conviction and 
construct legitimacy. For instance, by arguing that Japan’s ‘peace’ is under threat it could 
arguably become possible to re-articulate Japan’s “pacifism” and through this process depart 
from both the value-rational- and legal-rational legitimacy that restrain remilitarizing 
practices. If conducted successfully the displaced strategy will have succeeded in partially 
effecting the outcome desired in a strategy that lacks practical adequacy—namely the 
‘normalization’ of Japan. It is exactly this process as it has been occurring under the second 
Abe cabinet that this thesis will engage with.      
  
Critical Discourse Analysis as Methodology 
As to adequately analyse the process of contestation of Japan’s state identity this 
thesis will employ CDA as its chosen methodology. Discourse analysis has come a long way 
from having previously being regarded as the ‘dangerous’ science of a ‘deviant 
community.’ 57  Especially the postmodern variant of discourse analysis based on the 
conceptualizations of Laclau and Mouffe has inspired recent relational constructivist inquiry. 
However, based upon the critique of postmodern discourse analysis this study will instead 
turn to CDA as espoused by Norman Fairclough. In drawing from Fairclough’s 
understanding of discourse as existing in a dialectical relation with the material this thesis 
will seek to analyse how the Abe cabinet sought to overcome the directionality of Japan’s 
state identity through the articulation and operationalization of a ‘proactive pacifism’ 
discourse as contained within Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy.   
 CDA differs from other forms of discourse analysis in that it is a form of normative 
and explanatory critique and that it is theoretically presupposed on a critical realist 
understanding of the social world. CDA is normative in that it evaluates how existing realities 
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interact with their presupposed value systems; and the critique is explanatory in how it seeks 
to demonstrate that such realities are the outcome of different structures, mechanisms and 
forces. 58  As alluded to earlier, the critical realist perspective is demonstrated in the 
understanding of discourses existing in a dialectical relation with a material reality. 
Furthermore, CDA is an inherently interdisciplinary undertaking that draws from, and 
integrates different theories so as to gain a more complete understanding of the different 
structures, mechanisms and forces at play. This is represented in this thesis by drawing on IR 
identity theory; Gramsci’s political theory; and Fairclough’s understanding of discourse as a 
‘moment in the social process’.59       
 Drawing on the conceptualization of Japan’s state identity as a hegemonic construct 
and the process of contestation as conceived in the previous section this thesis will seek to 
analyse how the Abe cabinet overcame these restraints in the following way. First this thesis 
will conduct a modest genealogy of Abe’s revisionist agenda by demonstrating that the 
antecedents to this revisionism reside in the legacy of his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke; 
furthermore, this section will demonstrate how a lack of practical adequacy prevented the 
operationalization of this revisionist agenda during the Cold War and then demonstrate how 
from the 1980’s onward this practical adequacy gradually came into being, thus facilitating 
Abe’s revisionist ambitions. Subsequently, the thesis will briefly engage with the question of 
how Abe during his first and second term as Prime Minister of Japan engendered the 
discourse circles needed for the operationalization of a displaced discursive strategy. 
 For the second step an analytical focus on a single landmark document will be 
conducted. To this end, this thesis will analyse Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) 
of 17 December 2013. The discourses contained within the NSS can be regarded as part of a  
‘imaginary’, or representations of how the world ought or could or should be. 60  By 
scrutinizing how the NSS is situated – through its position in an existing order of discourse – 
and how it interacts with that order, it becomes possible to ascertain how the NSS as a part of 
a displaced strategy seeks to contest Japan’s current state identity. To this end this thesis first 
identifies the NSS as belonging in the intertextual chain of previous strategic documents, 
such as the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG), and then establishes how the NSS 
imposes, re-contextualizes and removes elements of the order of discourse. The new 
discursive configurations unearthed through this approach are then subsequently analysed and 
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critiqued on account of how their arguments compose the securitization of a re-articulated 
“pacifist” discourse that seeks to appropriate value-rational legitimacy as to overcome the 
restraints of Article 9.          
 The third and final step of analysis will be the tracing of this ‘proactive pacifism’ 
discourse in real-time by seeking out confrontational political events within which these 
discourse were interjected and leveraged as to achieve the Abe cabinet’s revisionist ambitions.  
Fortunately, Abe Shinzō’s second term as Prime Minister of Japan is replete with such 
occasions. This means that the political and public debate that surrounded the 2013 Act on 
the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9; and the 
2015 enactment of the Law for Peace and Security will provide the ‘textual events’ from 
which the operationalization of discourses can be sampled. This will entail a scholastic 
interaction with speeches, interviews and Diet debates within which Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzō turned to these discourses as to legitimate and bring about his sought after reforms.  
  
Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Protracted Revisionism 
Japan’s anti-militarist state identity has been contested ever since it became a 
hegemonic construct in the early 1960’s, when the adoption of the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ by 
Japan’s political elite ensured relative stability for the remainder of the Cold War. However, 
the end of this geopolitical struggle has enabled a loosening of the identity’s restraints – thus 
allowing revisionist politicians to gradually and incrementally effect the practical adequacy 
needed to operationalize a strategy of contestation. Especially Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has 
drawn on the emergence of this practical adequacy as to effect his revisionist ambitions by 
engendering new discourse circles that have espoused new and re-articulated discourses in 
order to overcome the restraints imposed by Japan’s state identity. This section will engage 
with the origins of Abe’s revisionist ideology, by tracing it back to the political thought of 
Abe’s grandfather: Kishi Nobusuke, and will subsequently analyse how practical adequacy 
has emerged from the 1980’s onward. Finally, the section will conclude by illuminating how 
Abe has appropriated this practical adequacy as to operationalize a strategy of contestation.
 When Abe Shinzō became Prime Minister of Japan in 2006 he vowed to ‘make a 
clean break with the post-war regime’ and endeavour to construct a ‘beautiful Japan’.61 This 
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‘post-war regime’ refers to Japan’s anti-militarist state identity which, according to Abe, is a 
U.S. imposed political order that restrains Japan’s true national identity and vigour and thus 
prevents the country from again rising as a great power.62 The foundation of this imposed 
order are formed by the 1947 Constitution of Japan and especially Article 9, which prohibits 
Japan from using military force as to solve international disputes as well as the maintenance 
of a conventional military. Abe’s desire to revise the Constitution of Japan as turn Japan into 
a ‘normal country’ demonstrates marked similarities with the political thought of Abe’s 
maternal grandfather and Japan’s Prime Minister from 1957-1960: Kishi Nobusuke. As a 
revisionist politician Kishi had sought to effect Japan’s re-emergence as an independent state 
and equal partner of the U.S. by revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and through 
constitutional revision.63 Although Kishi did succeed in the former this success came at a 
high political cost – Kishi was forced to step down which effectively ensured that the issue of 
constitutional revision would remain dormant during the Cold War.    
 It is the frustrated revisionism of Kishi that Abe has actively been pursuing 
throughout both his terms as Prime Minister of Japan (2006-2007 and 2012-present). 
Although the influence of Kishi’s politics on Abe’s revisionist ideology remains controversial, 
it seems likely that there is indeed a connection between both grandfather and grandson. For 
instance, in his book Towards a Beautiful Country  (2006), Abe directly refers to his 
grandfather as a formative influence.64 Moreover, Abe has often turned to Kishi’s political 
legacy, especially the controversial revision of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty, as to legitimize 
his own security reforms.65 This proximity of Abe’s agenda to that of his grandfather has 
ensured criticism that claims Abe’s ambitions to be ‘anachronistic’ and ‘devoid of  ‘a 
systematic analysis of various policy options.’ 66  Although describing Abe’s politics as 
‘anachronistic’ misses the nuances of Abe’s politics, it does however seem probable that 
Kishi’s legacy has had a direct and guiding influence on Abe’s desire to turn Japan into a 
‘normal’ country.          
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 The protracted nature of Japan’s revisionist politics is the outcome of Kishi’s failure 
to effect constitutional revisionism and the subsequent solidification of Japan anti-militarist 
state identity from the 1960’s onward. Within the Cold War the centrist ‘1955 system’ had 
successfully won the War of Position that was waged from 1945 to 1960, which ensured that 
Japan’s foreign policy was mainly effected through an economic focus as to facilitate the 
economic revival of Japan as per the ‘Yoshida Doctrine.’ Within this equilibrium the 
‘mainstream’ of the Liberal Democratic Party ensured political control through co-opting the 
revisionist ‘anti-mainstream’ by offering them security related reforms. Nevertheless, these 
reforms were accompanied by the instalment of new ‘brakes (hadome),’ something which the 
mainstream argued was needed to acquiesce the political left, which desired a disarmed and 
neutral Japan as a ‘peace state (heiwa kokka).’ This process of ‘reach, reconcile, reassure’ 
ensured not only a legitimate process of effecting reform, but also demonstrated how 
discourse circles ranging from political parties, ministries such as the Ministry of 
International Trade and Technology (MITI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), as 
well as grass-roots groups could ensure adherence to Article 9 by using “pacifist” discourses 
as to force adherence to Article 9.67 The directionality of this “pacifist” discourse was so 
effective that it necessitated that reform was effected surreptitiously through the 
accumulation of fait accomplis known as kiseijijitsu no tsumiage.68    
 From the 1980’s onward these restrains did, however, start to gradually loosen. It was 
under the revisionist Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro that discourses regarding Japan 
making an ‘international contribution’ started to emerge. This eventually resulted in Japan 
making civilian contributions to United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO). 69 
Civilian participation in UNPKO was, however, as far as Nakasone’s revisionist ‘grand 
design’ would go on account of resistance of the bureaucracy and mainstream politicians 
against more visible military profile for Japan. 70  This illustrates that whilst discursive 
creativity allowed a revisionist identity entrepreneur to modestly overcome the restraints of 
Japan’s identity, it could not overcome the vested interest provided by the hierarchies of 
Japan’s hegemonic state identity. Nevertheless, the ‘international contribution’ discourse was 
the beginning of a gradual and incremental process within which new discourses successfully 
enabled new policy and laws.         
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 This dialectic became especially apparent with the end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent 1991 Gulf War. The perception of structural shocks occurring around Japan 
allowed for old ‘realist’ discourses to re-emerge; such discourses revolved around the need 
for Japanese statesmen to keep in line with the ‘trends of the world’ as to ensure Japan’s 
stability—a notion that was amplified by international criticism regarding Japan’s failure to 
‘show the flag’ during the Gulf War.71  As a result these discourses could legitimately inform 
an increasingly public debate regarding Japan’s future role—and thus identity—in the 
international community. Within this debate there arose voices that called for Japan to 
become a ‘normal country’ that could apply its military force internationally under UN 
auspices.72 As a result of this debate gradual and incremental changes started to occur with 
regard to Japan’s security policy – a process which was facilitated by the end of the 1955 
system following the 1994 elections combined with the gradual decline of the political left. 
This process started with the 1992 ‘Law on Cooperation in UN Peacekeeping and Other 
Operations’ and the subsequent deployment of the SDF to Cambodia to support UNPKO. 
Other such changes included the 1996 Revised Defence Guidelines and the joint development 
of ballistic missile defences with the US.    `   
 As such the end of the Cold War had functioned as a catalyst through which ‘realist’ 
and ‘international contribution’ discourses were internalized within Japan’s security policy, 
thus ensuring an increasing legitimacy for such discourses within policy circles. This 
dialectic arguably came to a head with the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2001 and 
the Emergency Law and Iraq Special Measures Law in 2003. The latter of these laws 
allowing the unprecedented dispatch of SDF troops to non-combat areas during the Iraq War. 
This deployment demonstrated how ‘realist’ discourses had sufficiently corroded ‘pacifist’ 
related discourses within the political arena, a trend that has continued into the present the 
LDP and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), vying for supremacy in an ongoing debate on 
who’s realism is most realist.73 Despite practical adequacy having emerged in the political 
sphere, on the level of civic society the deployment of the SDF reawakened appreciation for 
Article 9 and ensured that the SDF mission fell short of ‘crossing the Rubicon.’74      
 This reaffirmation of Article 9 notwithstanding, civil society also witnessed changing 
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perceptions beneficial to the emergence of practical adequacy. For instance, within civil 
society the once publicly taboo subject of constitutional revision was increasingly debated by 
the public. This had been the achievement of liberal politicians, such as Hatoyama Yukio, 
which ensured public support for liberal revision initiatives whilst remaining suspicious of 
their conservative counterparts. 75 Furthermore, the 2000’s witnessed an increasing public 
appreciation for the SDF, a development that was accompanied with increasingly negative 
perceptions of neighbouring states such as China and North Korea.76  This signalled that 
whilst conservative revisionist initiatives still lacked the conviction needed within civil 
society, practical adequacy had emerged to an extent. This development combined with 
conviction and practical adequacy being present in the political sphere ensured that Abe 
Shinzō as Prime Minister of Japan found himself relatively less restrained as to effect a 
revisionist strategy, albeit a displaced one, than his predecessors.     
 During Abe’s brief first term as Prime Minister of Japan he was only able to achieve 
the minimum of his revisionist goals on account of his inability to match his leadership style 
to public expectations and his embroilment in political scandals. 77  Nevertheless, despite 
failing to effect constitutional revision, Abe did succeed in turning the Japan Defence Agency 
(JDA) into the Ministry of Defence (MOD), thus raising it to the full status of ministry. 78 
This raised the status of MOD employees which made them the equals of their counterparts 
in other ministries and thus giving them a more authoritative voice in determining Japan’s 
security policy. This creation of the MOD and that of “expert” panels, such as the ‘The 
Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security,’ would allow the Abe 
during his second term as Prime Minister from 2012 onward to gradually create new 
‘discourse circles’ that vocalized and sought to legitimize Abe’s revisionist strategy.  
 Abe’s disrupted attempts at revisionism  continued when he returned as Prime 
Minister of Japan in 2012. Despite depicting himself as a pragmatist concerned with 
economic reform through his ‘Abenomics’ program, Abe remained intent on effecting 
constitutional revision, or failing that reinterpretation. To this end Abe sought to engender 
new discourse circles and co-opted existing ones, whilst suppressing discourse circles that 
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opposed him as to render his goal of a normalized Japan a reality. Within the political sphere, 
Abe effected this by strengthening the position of the executive branch (Kantei) and the 
MOD in determining defence strategy and its accompanying policy. Historically, the 
executive branch and officials from the JDA had enjoyed relatively little policy influence on 
account of a lack of staff for the Kantei and because of the status of the JDA as an agency as 
opposed to a ministry. 79  Under Koizumi Junichirō (2001-2006) the Kantei gradually 
accumulated more power vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and parliament, whilst the creation of the 
MOD ensured equal status for defence officials in relation to their civilian counterparts.80 
Abe sought to build on these reforms through the creation of a National Security Council as 
to further increase the grip of the Kantei and the MOD of defence affairs.   
 To this end Abe reinstated the ‘Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the 
Prime Minister’s Office Regarding National Security,’ on the recommendation of which 
Japan’s National Security Council (NSC) was established in December 2013. The NSC 
replaced the old Security Council which had been hampered by inter-ministerial sectionalism 
on account of its 9-minister format, which effectively rendered it a ‘mere rubber 
stamp.’81Although the NSC’s 4-minister format, consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief Cabinet Secretary, arguably streamlined the 
decision making process in times of crisis, it also allowed for a greater role for the Kantei and 
the MOD in security affairs at the expense of other ministries. As such officials from the 
Kantei and MOD could now speak with more authority on the subject of security on account 
of their increased power and access to information and intelligence which is not publicly 
available as a result of the 2013 State Secrets Law. As such it can be argued that the NSC 
constituted a new and powerful discourse circle that could speak with legitimacy on the 
subject of security on account of its expertise as well as access to information. This authority 
was immediately appropriated by the publishing of Japan’s first National Security Strategy on 
17 December 2013.           
 Whilst the Abe cabinet would continue to loosen civilian control of the military by 
abolishing the MOD’s Bureau of Operational Policy, the Prime Minister also sought to ensure 
discursive dominance in other areas.82  Within his second term as Prime Minister, Abe sought 
                                                 
79 Glenn D. Hook, et al. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics and security (London: Routledge, 
2012), 47, 49.  
80 Ibid, 49. 
81 Shinichi Kitaoka, “A “Proactive Contribution to peace” and the Right of Collective Self-Defense: The 
Development of Security Policy in the Abe Administration,” Asia-Pacific Review 21:2 (2014), 4. 
82 Mark Craig, The Abe Restoration: Contemporary Japanese Politics and Reformation (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2016), 67 
Christian de Bock S1450085 
 
22 
 
to ensure positive public approval as to prevent the plummeting ratings that had marked his 
2006-2007 tenure. To this end, Abe entrusted Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide with 
establishing an informal body that monitored ratings and provided Abe with strategies to 
positively influence public opinion.83  The Abe cabinet went a step further by actively placing 
fellow revisionists to media related boards and committees as to ensure positive coverage, as 
was the case with Momii Katsuto as Director-General of Japan’s state media outlet NHK.84 
Such unconventional methods did lead to criticism and questions being raised about the 
press-freedom in Japan. Nevertheless, instead of assuaging such fears the Abe cabinet sought 
to further repress negative coverage by forcefully effecting the departure of journalists that 
posed critical questions to government officials regarding Abe security reforms.85  In another 
instance of media repressions the Abe cabinet stressed the broadcasting law during elections, 
which required broadcasters to give balanced political coverage.86     
 The above demonstrates  how from the 1980’s onward the restraints of Japan’s state 
identity were gradually loosened. This process originated with the creative discourse’s of an 
‘international contribution’ which used the perception of a changing international structure, 
and re re-emergence of ‘realist’ discourses, as to legitimately internalize itself within 
Japanese security policy. The ensuing dialectic between discourse and practice  eventually 
ensured that practical adequacy was attained within the political sphere. Abe Shinzō has 
subsequently sought to extend this practical adequacy to the civil sphere by constituting new 
and co-opted discourse circles as to  appropriate the legitimacy and conviction needed effect 
his desired normalization of Japan. A process within which the ‘imaginary’ of the  National 
Security Strategy played a vital role.  
 Japan’s National Security Strategy as an ‘Imaginary’ for Revisionism 
The publishing of Japan’s first National Security Strategy on 17 December  2013 was 
lauded as a defining strategic document in that it provided unified guidance for the nation’s 
security and diplomacy.87 Because of this status ample attention has been paid to the strategic 
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efficacies pronounced by the NSS. However, the document has not received similar analytical 
attention as a component of a discursive strategy—or ‘imaginary’. As such it will prove 
fruitful to discuss the parties and process by which the document came into existence; how 
the NSS as a component of a discursive strategy functions; and how the tensions, 
contradictions and omissions that reside within the document relate to and influence the goal 
of making Japan more secure and prosperous. In doing so, this paper can elucidate and 
critique both the impact of the NSS on Japan’s society as well as its state identity.  
 The publishing of the National Security Strategy coincided with the establishment of 
the National Security Council and can as such be traced back to the period of the first Abe 
cabinet. The responsibility for drafting the document resided with the ‘Council on Security 
and Defence Capabilities’ which was chaired by Kitaoka Shinchi, then head of the 
International University of Japan. Like other “expert” panels convened by the Abe cabinet, it 
appears that participating members all shared similar ‘realist’ inclinations towards security. 
This is illustrated by statements made by Kitaoka, such as: ‘a balance of power is necessary 
for peace in the real world: the idea that disarmament is the road to peace is, as a rule, a 
delusion.’88 Such statements demonstrate that the drafting of the NSS was predominantly 
guided by ‘realist’ thinking, which runs perpendicular to the norms espoused by Article 9 of 
the Constitution.          
 The realist inclination of this panel together with the revisionist ambitions of Prime 
Minister Abe give credence to the hypothesis that the NSS is more than the strategic 
document it proclaims to be; instead it likely forms a preconceived notion of a desired and 
possible reality, containing objectives and the means to achieve it—the NSS forms an 
‘imaginary’. This entails that the goals and policies espoused to achieve it have dual 
meaning: as an actual strategy for securing Japan and as a means of bringing about a new 
social order by realigning power relations within society.  It is because of this displaced 
second strategy that the policies espoused by the NSS require scrutiny as to establish how its 
proposed methods to render Japan more secure relate to the democratic values its seeks to 
safeguard.            
 As a document that exists within, and reproduces particular elements of, the order of 
discourse of security the NSS displays a high degree of intertextuality. In terms of structure 
as well as language the NSS can clearly be positioned within the intertextual chain comprised 
by the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 1976, 1995, 2004, 2010 and 2013. 
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Interestingly enough the Abe cabinet’s NSS reproduces many of the initiatives of the DPJ’s 
2010 NDPG and other DPJ initiatives, by modestly altering terms such as ‘dynamic defence’ 
to ‘dynamic joint defence’ and ‘Peace Creating Country’ to ‘Proactive Pacifism (sekkyokuteki 
heiwashugi).’89 Proactive Pacifism is also referred to as ‘A Proactive Contribution to Peace,’ 
which Oros regards as more properly conveying ‘the spirit of the phrase to a foreign 
audience.’ 90  Contrary to this opinion, it seems much more likely that the Abe cabinet 
strategically utilized translation as to stress the desired ‘contribution’ to a foreign audience, 
whilst assuaging fears of remilitarization by a domestic audience by including ‘pacifism.’
 This is not the only instance of flexible language use in the NSS since it actively alters, 
re-contextualized and integrates discourses that previously underpinned Japan’s continued 
adherence to Article 9. This is best illustrated by a section of text which has been stably 
reproduced in all published NDPG’s since 1976. This section conveys the restrictions and 
principles that Japan adheres to on account of Article 9, the full section reads:  
 Under the Constitution and in line with basic principles such as maintaining an 
exclusively defence-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a 
threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold its basic defence policies, such 
as securing civilian control, maintaining the three non-nuclear principles, and building a 
modest defence force.91  
Despite having been stably reproduced in a variety of defence related documents this is not 
the case in the 2013 NSS. Although the NSS maintains such statements regarding ‘not posing 
a threat to other countries’ and adherence to ‘the non-nuclear principles,’ it alters the 
composition of this section by abandoning allusions to a ‘modest defence force’ and, more 
importantly,  by replacing any reference to ‘the Constitution,’ instead replacing it with Japan 
as having ‘consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation.’ 92  Despite the 
accompanying NDPG of 2013 still referring to the Constitution it seems that within Japan’s 
more long-term strategic thinking Japan’s Constitution will not figure dominantly as an 
influencing factor. Thus arguably signalling the desire of the second Abe cabinet to abandon 
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the supreme law’s restrictions on remilitarization.       
 These references to Japan’s supposed ‘peace-loving’ nature as opposed to the 
pacifism implied by allusions to the Constitution is related to the re-articulation of ‘pacifism’ 
as a signifier. This re-articulation seeks to depict Japan’s “pacifism” since 1945 as a ‘negative 
pacifism (shoukyokuteki heiwashugi)’ which stands in opposition to the Abe cabinets desired 
proactive pacifism—alternately ready as ‘positive pacifism (Sekkyokuteki heiwashugi).’ This 
negative/passive pacifism entailed, according to Kamiya Matake, a military solely for the use 
of Japan’s territorial defence and the denial that there was a role for the military in the 
maintenance of peace.93 This concept of pacifism is subsequently critiqued, by Kamiya, by 
invoking the realist orthodoxy that ‘in reality, peace and order cannot exist without force,’ 
leading to the conclusion that Japan must use military force proactively to ensure peace.94 
Such a re-articulation thus draws on the need for a ‘balance of power’ through ‘deterrence’ as 
the guarantor of peace. Such a re-articulation does, however, run perpendicular the war 
renouncing clause of the Constitution, namely Article 9.      
 Anticipating such critiques, the NSS co-opts the preamble of the Constitution as a 
means of contesting it. According to Kitaoka Shinichi, the phrase ‘a proactive contribution to 
peace,’ is in accordance with the preamble which ‘proposes that Japan should not ignore the 
international community.’95 This notion is, however, problematic. The preamble states that 
Japan should be: ‘striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and 
slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth,’96 Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of the phrase in the preamble means that it places no legal implications on the Japanese 
government to act towards that goal, unlike the anti-militarist clause of Article 9 whose 
inclusion into the main text of the Constitution places actual legal restrictions on the Japanese 
government. 97  As such by tying the re-articulation of ‘pacifism’ to the preamble of the 
constitution the NSS seeks to appropriate the absolute value of ‘pacifism,’ and thus its value-
rational legitimacy, as to overcome the legal-rational legitimacy of Article 9.   
 Nevertheless, such a re-articulation would likely encounter resistance on account of 
the public’s preference of Article 9 as the guarantor of Japan’s peace and prosperity. 
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Furthermore, a more ‘proactive’ foreign policy could, and has, invoked public fears of Japan 
becoming embroiled in foreign conflicts and thus ensuring opposition to such a re-articulation. 
As to overcome such concerns the NSS first seeks to ‘naturalize’ a proactive role for Japan 
and further seeks to depict it as a necessity in the light of emerging “threats” – thus turning to 
securitization practices. The naturalization of Japan’s role as a ‘proactive pacifist’ state is 
accomplished by demonstrating its antecedents within Japan’s post-war history. To this end 
the NSS depicts Japan’s involvement in economic growth, human security and trade and 
investment in a variety of international locales as an indication that Japan has always 
proactively sought to engender security by economic development. Furthermore, according to 
the NSS, Japan’s involvement in UNPKO has ‘garnered significant praise and respect’ 
globally and as such ‘Japan must continue these steps’ as to further strengthen its image as a 
‘peace-loving’ nation. 98  Although it is a fact that Japan has been actively involved in 
engendering regional economic growth it remains to be debated if this was solely out of 
charitable motives, or solely to facilitate Japanese economic growth.99  Furthermore, the 
question remains that if this model was so successful, why would the Abe government want 
to alter it by introducing an increased military role for Japan – which could possibly raise 
regional fears regarding Japan’s intentions.        
 As to justify the departure from a passive pacifism to a proactive pacifism, the NSS 
turns to the invocation of a multifarious and international threat as to render the constitution’s 
re-articulation coercive and palatable. Within the problem-solution structure of the NSS, 
Japan becoming a ‘proactive pacifist’ state forms the solution to the problem of an 
‘increasingly severe security environment.’ 100  Japan’s ‘increasingly severe security 
environment’ consists of a multitude of different “threats” ranging from the regional: China’s 
assertive altering of the post-war status quo and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile 
development program, to the global: international terrorism and economic interdependence 
through globalization.101  This “threat” can thus be categorized within two threat categories: a 
‘realist’ category, changing power balances, and a ‘neo-liberal’ category, economic 
interdependence. The complicated and international character of this “threat” requires, 
according to the NSS, far-reaching security reforms as to allow the Government of Japan to 
effect its ‘primary responsibility,’ namely: ‘maintaining the peace and security of Japan and 
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ensuring its survival.’102         
 Such reforms would include a strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, deepening 
intelligence sharing, broadening the capabilities and responsibilities of the SDF and 
increasing international cooperation for UNPKO. 103  Although these reforms might seem 
benign they have had a profound impact on Article 9 of the Constitution. After all, deepening 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance and UNPKO capabilities both required the ‘unconstitutional’ 
reinterpretation of Article 9 as to allow for, for instance, collective self-defence.104 As such 
whilst the document reaffirms Japan’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law 
internationally, the NSS itself allows the Japanese government to undermine both democratic 
procedures and laws by evoking that an extraordinary “threat” requires extraordinary reforms. 
After all, ‘these threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could instantly have 
a direct influence on the security of Japan’, and ‘Japan cannot secure its own peace and 
security by itself’.105 In articulating these “threats” as global and complicated the NSS seeks 
to invoke a sense of urgency as to render its desired reforms more coercive and legitimate. As 
to legitimize these reforms the NSS draws on re-articulated value-rational legitimacy, whilst 
combining this with the legitimacy engendered by the analytical efficacy that ‘realist’ and 
‘neoliberal’ discourses pertain to carry within their respective scientific field.106   
 Nevertheless, the actual threat posed by the “threat” articulated in the NSS remains to 
be debated. Certainly, China has continued to increase its defence spending by double digits; 
North Korea remains unwilling to relinquish its nuclear- and missile programs; and 
international terrorism and failed states could pose a challenge to Japan. However, it remains 
to be seen whether such challenges pose as immediate a threat that requires the suspensions 
of ordinary deliberative politics and the rule of law in Japan. Furthermore, the defence and 
diplomatic solutions that the NSS proposes could arguable negatively influence Japan’s peace 
and prosperity. With regard to China, the NSS seeks to formulate a diplomatic strategy of 
containment by increasing defence ties with countries that uphold the same ‘universal 
values.’107At the same time the NSS requires Japan to strengthen its deterrence by deepening 
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U.S.-Japan cooperation and improving Japan’s military capabilities. Yet, the wisdom of 
encircling and excluding Japan’s number one trading partner hardly seems to contribute to 
the peace and prosperity of resource poor Japan. Moreover,  China regards the U.S. as a 
disruptive force in the region and as such a deepening of defence ties between the U.S and 
Japan could result in an increase in tensions. Similarly, regional weapons modernization 
programs by South Korea and Japan as well as U.S. pressure have, according to Gaertner, 
contributed to the DPRK’s insecurity, thus ensuring the continuation the North’s nuclear 
weapons program as opposed to its termination. 108  Finally the wisdom of dealing with 
international terrorism through military means should have been discredited by the disastrous 
effects of the War on Terror.          
 As such it seems that the challenges and threats discerned by the NSS might be better 
served through diplomacy, dialogue and economic investment and do not require the far-
reaching defence reforms espoused by the NSS. Such a conclusion  demonstrates that the 
NSS purposefully exaggerates the “threats” that Japan faces as to utilize these as a coercive 
argument, in which the re-articulation of Japan’s ‘passive pacifism’ to a ‘proactive pacifism’ 
can be legitimately facilitated by appropriating value-rational legitimacy. If successful, the 
“threat” and the appropriated value-rational legitimacy then allow for the Abe cabinet to 
garner the conviction and legitimacy needed to overcome the legal-rational restraints imposed 
by Article 9 – as to ensure the re-emergence of Japan as a ‘normal state.’   
Tracing the National Security Discourse in Japan’s Security Debate: 
2012-2015 
Subsequent to the publishing of the National Security Strategy, the Abe cabinet 
sought to render the policy objectives as set forth in this imaginary a reality. Exploiting the 
practical adequacy that had emerged over the preceding decades and the discourse circles that 
he had engendered, Abe Shinzō pushed for various security reforms aimed at corroding 
Article 9. Nevertheless, public opposition to the Abe cabinet’s security reforms continued. 
This demonstrated that whilst the Abe cabinet might have enjoyed relative dominance within 
the Diet, this dominance—not to mention intellectual and moral leadership—failed to 
materialize on the level of civil society. So whilst politically Abe was capable of effecting the 
desired security reforms, the ability of these reforms to engender a new state identity for 
Japan remain dubious in that they lack public conviction—signalling the failure of Abe’s re-
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articulated ‘peace’ discourse to garner the legitimacy and consent needed for a new 
hegemony.          
 Throughout the period of 2012-2015, the Abe cabinet effected a series of security 
reforms that constituted, in the words of one critic, ‘a movement to increase pressure on the 
constitution by pushing for reinterpretation and passing unconstitutional laws.’109 Indeed the 
process, which began with the 2013 establishment of the National Security Council and was 
followed by the ‘Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (Hereafter: State 
Secrets Law),’ the 2014 re-interpretation of the constitution’s Article 9, and finding its  
culmination in the 2015 enactment of the ‘Legislation for Peace and Security,’ posed some of 
the most far-reaching reforms of the post-Cold War era. However, Abe’s willingness to break 
political ‘taboos’ through assertive methods put him at loggerheads with the public and 
opposition parties. As to negate criticism and possibly gain the conviction of a wider segment 
of civil society, Abe turned to the ‘proactive pacifism’ discourse; seeking to leverage the 
‘threats’ construed in this document as to render the suspension of ordinary deliberative 
politics palatable—thus legitimizing the Abe cabinet’s securitization practices.   
 Within its ‘semiotic moment’ the Abe Cabinet’s security reforms were accompanied 
by the invocation of the NSS’s ‘proactive pacifism’ discourse. On a variety of occasions, and 
to a varying degree, the Abe cabinet turned to the emergence of ‘threats’ that illustrated the 
logic of the NSS, thus legitimizing the document’s proposed objectives. One of the main 
‘threats’ the Abe cabinet referred to as to demonstrate the ‘reality’ of Japan’s increasingly 
severe security environment was Tokyo’s continuing territorial dispute with China over the 
Senkaku islands. Prior to the establishment of the NSC and the enactment of the State Secrets 
Law, China had declared an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Senkaku’s 
airspace in November of 2013. Within the ongoing dispute, the declaration of the ADIZ 
formed another gradual escalation against the backdrop of the nationalization of some of the 
Senkaku islands from “private ownership” by the government of Tokyo during the preceding 
year. This tit-for-tat escalation was, however, conveniently forgotten by the Abe cabinet: 
declaring the ADIZ an ‘unilateral escalation.’110 This labelling illustrated the Abe cabinet’s 
willingness to use its territorial tensions with Beijing as a means of operationalizing the NSS 
imaginary by exaggerating diplomatic disputes into a security affair. To this end Abe stressed 
how this ‘escalation’ emphasized the need for a NSC and greater intelligence sharing 
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between Japan and the U.S as to prevent such ‘grey-zone’ incidents from occurring.111 The 
opportunistic nature of this ‘threat’ was made clear when the ADIZ quickly faded from 
government discourse and consciousness, having now become a part of the accepted status 
quo in the region, to hardly be heard of at all.       
 The 2013 ADIZ incident was to be the first of multiple attempts by the Abe cabinet to 
frame its territorial and diplomatic tensions with Beijing as existential threats. In the 
following years, Abe continued to draw on Chinese encroachment through ‘grey zone’ 
incidents as to justify its security reforms. This included the publishing of data about the 
increasing amount of Chinese fishery, coastguard and military incursions into Japan’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the number of Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) fighter 
scrambles in response to Chinese incursions into Japanese airspace.112  In a similar vein to the 
2013 ADIZ incident, the Abe cabinet, during the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security 
debate, published data regarding Chinese drilling rigs close to Japanese border waters as to 
underline the continued threat posed by China. 113  The publishing of such data and the 
invocation of the China threat often correlated with the debate about, or the enactment of, 
controversial security reforms. This correlation suggest that the Abe cabinet sought to 
appropriate tensions with China for its own domestic political gain at the expense of Chinese 
condemnation.          
 The Abe cabinet’s appropriation and escalation of territorial and diplomatic disputes 
with China were mimicked in a variety of other incidents ranging from regional threats such 
as China and North Korea to Islamic terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East. These 
threats were—in-line with NSS doctrine—depicted as not simply bilateral security issues, but 
instead as fluid and global threats requiring a multilateral response. As such Chinese revision 
of the post-war status quo, entailing the curtailing of rights of free passage; the increasingly 
global reach of North Korea’s nuclear- and missile programs; and international terrorism, 
were all drawn upon and depicted as requiring a more muscular and cooperative international 
response. If Japan would fail to meet this challenge, it would risk abandonment from its 
partners—thus losing the deterrence that, according to Abe had guaranteed Japan’s post-war 
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security.114  By drawing on the international and complicated nature of the ‘threat’ and the 
consequences of inaction, Abe sought to legitimize the objectives sought after by the NSS. 
After all, the extraordinary measures of the NSS required and equally extraordinary threat as 
to legitimize not only the envisioned reforms, but also the political means by which these 
reforms were effected.          
 Drawing on the immediate nature of the threat, as well as his political responsibility to 
secure the peaceful livelihood and prosperity of the Japanese public, Abe turned away from 
more democratic methods. This often meant that Abe relied on his majority in the Diet as to 
ensure the passing of legislation through political force, as opposed to consensus gained by 
deliberation. This was the case with the enactment of the 2013 State Secrets Law and the 
2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, which were criticised as having been ‘railroaded’ 
without proper public debate.115 In case of the 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 as to allow 
for collective self-defence, Abe broke with convention by choosing Komatsu Ichiro as the 
head of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB). The CLB had previously opposed 
reinterpretation, arguing that only a constitutional amendment by referendum was 
constitutional; under Komatsu, however, the CLB abandoned this position and 
reinterpretation as recommended by the ‘Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal 
Basis for Security’ was enacted by the cabinet.116  The reinterpretation was immediately 
criticized by legal scholars as ‘unconstitutional,’ whilst Abe’s politics were regarded 
undemocratic even by his former mentor, Koizumi Junichirō, labelling them as ‘forceful.’117  
 Although Abe depicted his actions as a ‘responsible’ reaction to regional 
developments that enjoyed the mandate of the public, such claims seem at a disconnect with 
actual public sentiments. Abe drew upon election victories and relatively stable public 
approval ratings as to illustrate his ‘mandate’ received from the electorate.118  Although, 
Abe’s approval has been relatively stable, this stability likely emanates from his economic 
reform program as well as a lack of a credible political alternative to LDP rule. The fragile 
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nature of Abe’s mandate is further illustrated by a drop in approval ratings following security 
reform episodes combined with mass demonstrations. Abe’s approval ratings dropped below 
50 percent during the 2013 State Secret debate and 2014 reinterpretation, even falling to a 
mere 37 percent following the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2015.119 
Public discontent was more tangibly demonstrated by mass demonstrations that accompanied 
the security debate, growing into a national protest movement, with crowds surrounding the 
Diet reaching into the  thousands during the summer of 2015.120     
 The criticism that the public and the political opposition directed at the Abe cabinet 
was related to both its discursive- and material practices. On the discursive level, Abe’s 
sought to depict a more ‘proactive pacifism,’ centred around collective self-defence, as a 
necessity for guaranteeing Japan’s security through a credible deterrent. Nevertheless, the 
invocation of the ‘threat’ of Japan’s deteriorating security environment seemingly failed to 
garner the consent needed for the re-articulation of Japan’s pacifism. This was made 
adamantly clear with the public and opposition labelling Abe’s ‘Peace Bill’ as the ‘War 
Bill’—thus signalling the failure of Abe’s re-articulation of pacifism. One of the main 
reasons this re-articulation failed  was that the public seemingly feared entrapment in wars of 
foreign making more than abandonment by the U.S.121 Whilst Abe sought to convince the 
public that Japan’s peace and security had not been guaranteed by Japan’s “pacifism,” but 
instead by the deterrence provided by the U.S-Japan Security Treaty, the public remained 
sceptical. This is reflected in the low approval ratings for his security initiatives, with the 
Legislation for Peace and Security gaining only 29 percent of the publics support.122  
 Taking note of the opposition that accompanied his security reforms, Abe would often, 
after such an episode had occurred, declare that he would ‘humbly’ accept such criticism and 
explain his endeavours more carefully in the future.123 Such explanations would be given in a 
variety of media from newspapers, television shows and explanatory YouTube videos. Such 
efforts notwithstanding the public’s reaction to such appearances remained sceptical at 
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best.124 In another attempt to appear to be upholding proper deliberative politics, the Abe 
cabinet spend over 200 hours debating the Legislation for Peace and Security. However, 
following Abe’s visit to Washington D.C.—a move intended to demonstrate the international 
support for his revisionist agenda—the MOD published new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. 
Defence Cooperation, within which Japan already committed itself to collective self-defence 
measures. This resulted in widespread public outrage as the legislation allowing collective 
self-defence was still being debated within the Diet and this cart-before-horse approach 
ensured an increasingly sceptical public that the democratic process at play was simply 
window-dressing. 125  As a result, the eventual passing of the Legislation for Peace and 
Security appeared as another instance of Abe’s heavy-handed reliance on political force. 
 As the above illustrates Abe’s invocation of the ‘threat’ posed by Japan’s worsening 
security environment failed to rhetorically garner the consent needed for the re-articulation of 
Japan’s pacifism to a ‘proactive pacifism.’  The ‘threat’ of these developments and the need 
for a cooperative response as to render Japan secure, failed to supplant public fears about 
entrapment in foreign conflicts. As such Abe was unable to re-articulate the absolute value of 
Japan’s “pacifism” as to gain value-rational legitimacy. This failure, ensured that a departure 
from the legal restraints of Article 9 would still come at the expense of political capital in that 
a re-articulated pacifism that enjoyed the public’s consent could not be turned to as to 
engender a new legal-rational legitimacy based on a re-interpretation of Article 9. Despite 
these failures, and perhaps because of them, Abe turned to more authoritarian politics as to 
ensure the outcome he desired.         
 However, in turning to such practices, Abe arguably reignited public fears regarding 
his revisionist bent and the impact this would have on not only Article 9, but also on Japan’s 
democratic institutions. Certain vocal sections of the public clearly opposed the departure 
from Japan’s former “pacifist” tenets—and thus identity—on account of it being 
‘unconstitutional’ and undemocratic. This is illustrated by the emergence of new grass-roots 
groups such as the Student Emergency Action for Democracy (SEALDs) which sought to 
protect Japan’s liberal democratic values.126 As such, it can be argued that in seeking to effect 
a new identity as a ‘proactive pacifist’ state for Japan, Abe failed to engender both value-
rational- and legal-rational legitimacy, ensuring that his initiatives suffered from a legitimacy 
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deficit at best and illegitimacy at worst. So whilst Abe might, through political dominance—
have succeeded in engendering a new proactive policy in the realm of politics, these actions 
might very well have undermined the emergence of a new ‘proactive pacifist’ state identity in 
engendering new forms of public opposition.   
Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to contribute to the current debate regarding either the 
continuity or change apparent in Japan state identity. Arguing that both norm- and relational 
accounts of identity change relied on an exaggerated understanding of the efficacy of either 
the material or the ideational on identity change, this thesis sought to conceptualize a state 
identity’s stability as related to the dialectic between the discursive and the material. In doing 
so it attempted to elucidate the question regarding what strategies Abe Shinō utilized as to 
overcome the restraints imposed by Japan’s ‘peace-loving’ state identity as to effect the 
remilitarization of Japan?         
 To this end, this paper conceptualized a state’s identity as a hegemonic entity that 
provided ‘naturalized’ discourses that inhabit the social field of security’s order of discourse. 
Subsequently it demonstrated that through the internalization of discourses within practice 
and vice-versa a state’s hegemonic identity was able to restrain the emergence of new, or re-
articulated discourses, through its ‘directionality’—a process within which the institutions 
and organizations that inhibit the social field play a key role as ‘discourse circles.’ The 
efficacy of this CDA and Critical Realist conceptualization in relation to relational 
constructivism are that: a) it allows for the conceptualization of discourse as a causal 
mechanism; b) it remedies the idealized notion of discursive emergence as envisioned by 
postmodern scholars. Whilst arguably positioning itself closely to norm constructionism in 
acknowledging a place for social structures, it differentiated itself by providing a 
conceptualization of the role of discourse in the contestation of identities—something which 
had been lacking in norm constructivist accounts of identity change.    
 Drawing on this conceptualization of a state’s identity this thesis simultaneously 
provided a theory of how political entrepreneurs could overcome the restraints of the 
hegemonic state identity. This was achieved by applying Norman Fairclough’s concepts of 
displaced strategies and the role that imaginaries play within these strategies as a means of 
gaining public conviction through garnering legitimacy. As to demonstrate this process this 
thesis critically interacted with Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s revisionist ambitions. This was 
achieved through first demonstrating how practical adequacy had emerged since the 1980s 
Christian de Bock S1450085 
 
35 
 
thus allowing Abe the political power and worldviews needed to bring a revisionist strategy 
into being. Nevertheless, an overt revisionist strategy, presupposed on rendering Japan a 
‘normal country,’ lacked public conviction on account of this strategy being diametrically 
opposed to both value- and legal-rational legitimacy. As to counteract the illegitimacy and 
legitimacy deficit inherent within this strategy, Abe turned to newly engendered discourse 
circles as to operationalize a ‘displaced’ strategy in the form of Japan’s 2013 National 
Security Strategy—which formed an ‘imaginary’ for action. Within the imaginary of the NSS 
it was established how this document sought—by re-articulation and securitization—to effect 
the desired strategy, through a displaced strategy centred around Japan’s deteriorating 
security environment. By invoking the ‘threat’ of Japan’s deteriorating security environment 
the NSS sought to  legitimize the re-articulation from ‘negative pacifism’ towards a ‘positive 
pacifism.’ This new pacifism conveniently required the gradual undermining of the legal 
stature of Article 9 of the constitution as to ensure Japan’s security. As such, the NSS sought 
to appropriate value-rational legitimacy as a means to gain consent and legitimacy needed for 
the departure from Article 9 and democratic procedures and thus legal-rational legitimacy. 
 The discursive creativity of the NSS notwithstanding, the securitized and re-
articulated pacifist discourse contained within it failed to garner both consent and legitimacy 
within civil society. Whilst regional developments could credibly be depicted as threatening 
and despite enjoying political dominance, Abe’s departure from established democratic 
procedures and legal norms ensured public opposition. As such it can credibly argued that 
Abe failed to turn the directionality of Japan’s state identity against itself on account of his 
displaced strategy failing to gain the legitimacy and consent needed for a new hegemony. 
 Nevertheless, despite Abe’s failure to gain the public’s conviction, he did effect the 
security reforms he sought to effect—meaning that the goal of his displaced strategy was 
achieved, namely a departure from Article 9 legal restrictions. However, this outcome was 
ensured through a reliance on political force alone, which might very well entail a problem of 
sustainability. After all, the stability of Japan’s pacifist state identity was effected because it 
enjoyed both value- and legal-rational legitimacy in both the political- and civil sphere, which 
granted it hegemony through the dialectic between discourse and practice. Although, the 
successful passing of, for instance, the Legislation for Peace and Security, could dialectically 
ensure that Japan’s proactive identity becomes internalized in discourse – thus gradually 
altering the content of Japan’s  state identity, it remains to be seen if this will materialize. 
Furthermore, the lack of legitimacy that Abe’s security reforms enjoyed within the civil-
sphere could mean that in order to for Japan to behave as a ‘proactive pacifist’ state will 
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require continued political dominance as to ensure that a proactive security policy 
successfully displaces Japan’s disposition towards ‘negative pacifist’ policies.  In conclusion 
it can then be stated that Abe through successfully effecting material changes has moved 
Japan a little closer to becoming a ‘normal country’ but on account of his failure to engender 
a new hegemony through public consent – effected through discourse – has failed to  generate 
a new ‘proactive’ state identity for  Japan.  
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